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R E S E A R C H E S S A Y
M A R T I N G A I N S B O R O U G H
Malesky vs. Fforde: How Best to Analyze
Vietnamese Politics?
In , the Journal of Vietnamese Studies published a review by AdamFforde of an edited book on Vietnamese politics by Jonathan London. It
was quite a critical review. Fforde identified a number of weaknesses with the
volume, as well as with individual contributions, including a tendency not to
situate arguments within a wider literature, contradictory interpretation of
empirics, assuming what needs to be demonstrated, and making assertions
without evidence. Towards the end of the review, Fforde bemoans that the
volume contributors were allowed to go “their own way.” He continues:
“This is unfortunate. They should have been locked in a room and forced to
argue it out. There is a need for a decent and likely very noisy argument
about how best to analyze Vietnamese politics.” Fforde’s challenge is the
stepping off point for this article.
To be fair, some of Fforde’s points should not be cause for alarm. For
instance, that Vietnam scholars might interpret data in different ways is not
necessarily a problem. Indeed, one might argue that such differences are
indicative of a healthy and lively field. However, when we get into the area of
tending not to situate arguments within a wider literature—especially if it
entails ignoring arguments with which one does not agree—and more
important still, assuming what needs to be demonstrated, then we are into
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more serious terrain. This article attempts to sort out some of these issues
and clarify some of the underlying assumptions Vietnam politics scholars
are operating with.
Clearly, this is no small task. Much has been written about Vietnam
politics over many years—too much to review in a single article. To make
the task manageable, we have elected to focus on just two leading Vietnam
scholars: Adam Fforde, since he has laid down the challenge, and another
prominent Vietnam scholar, Edmund Malesky. Fforde and Malesky are both
highly distinguished and frequently cited scholars. They are also very dif-
ferent in their approaches to studying politics. We are interested in this
difference because it allows us to get at the issues that Fforde alludes to in
his review of London’s Politics in Contemporary Vietnam.
In this article, we first make some preliminary remarks in relation to the
research question we are considering (i.e., how best to analyze Vietnamese
politics?). We then look at Malesky’s and Fforde’s contributions in turn. As
we consider the two authors, we are interested not only in how they char-
acterize Vietnamese politics (i.e., what they argue) but also their underlying
assumptions. That is, what kind of terminology do they use? What are the
conceptual building blocks on which their arguments rest? Which wider
scholarly communities do they make connections with? Having compared
and contrasted Malesky and Fforde, we then consider how to understand
and account for their differences. The article concludes with suggestions for
further research. Our article is original in that Fforde and Malesky have
never been subject to close scrutiny like this before, let alone together.
Moreover, our findings suggest that there are fundamental differences
between the two scholars which, we suspect, speak to differences in the
Vietnam politics field at large. The differences partly relate to where Fforde
and Malesky focus their attention and what they argue, but more impor-
tantly they concern divergent perspectives as to what constitutes a meaning-
ful discussion of Vietnamese politics.
Before we turn to our first section, a note on methodology is in order,
notably in terms of the process of text selection of the two scholars
in question. We have endeavored to cover the full range of Fforde’s and
Malesky’s scholarship on Vietnam; this includes taking account of changes
in their arguments and approaches over time. In terms of text selection, we
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proceeded in two stages. We first focused on some of their more contem-
porary work in relation to Vietnam politics research today. We then con-
ducted a further stage of analysis to ensure a more comprehensive review.
This included an assessment of Fforde and Malesky’s earlier work to check
for continuity and change in their analyses, as well as a review of both
scholars’ most recent writing (i.e., articles or papers that had appeared since
our initial research). We have not included an analysis of Fforde’s theoretical
work on development or Malesky’s political science writing that does not
relate to Vietnam (although we do draw these texts to the readers’ attention
in passing). Not all of Fforde’s and Malesky’s writings are in peer-reviewed
journals; we have included such texts where they tell us something impor-
tant about either their ideas or their approach to analyzing Vietnamese
politics (some of Fforde’s year-enders in Asian Studies are included for this
reason). We discuss our methods for analyzing Fforde’s and Malesky’s in the
next section, which lays out our analytical framework.
How Best to Analyze Vietnamese Politics: What Kind of
Question is This?
Fforde’s question implies that there are better and worse ways to analyze
Vietnamese politics, even a “best” way. This prompts a number of questions:
Is this right? If it is right, where does exploring this question lead us? One
might say the notion that there is a best way to analyze Vietnamese politics is
a strange one. For instance, one could argue that much depends on the
specific question being asked, with different questions or research problems
requiring different theoretical or methodological approaches.
By way of a starting point, we might say that to pose the question of how
best to analyze Vietnamese politics is to pose a question about interpretation.
For instance, has the state in Vietnam been developing new techniques of rule
in the s, or has it been persisting with older ones? Or, is the Vietnamese
state tolerant or repressive? Scholars reasonably have different views on such
matters. However, this still does not go to the heart of the question.
To pose this question is also to raise a question about where to look. That
is, in order to get a handle on Vietnamese politics, do we think that scholars
should be looking at the activities of the Communist Party and/or government
(hereafter party-state), or should they be looking elsewhere (e.g. at so-called
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civil society organizations)? To talk in this way is to highlight a live issue with
respect to Vietnam politics, namely whether or not actors outside of party-
state structures have become more important in the last, say, twenty years.
Clearly, this begs the question “important in what sense?” While this is per-
haps a more complex question than it might first appear, we will answer it in
a straightforward manner at this stage, simply saying that “important” in this
case refers to an ability to influence outcomes. Having said this, we can see
that many scholars do indeed believe that actors “outside” of the party-state
have become more important in recent years. That this is a prevailing view is
reflected in the fact that more scholars are conducting research on “civil
society” than was the case previously. However, there is a sense in which
even this discussion fails to take us to the heart of the matter when it comes to
what the question of how best to analyze Vietnamese politics might be getting
at. There is a sense that there are even more fundamental issues at stake.
What is striking about the previous discussion is that it begs so many
questions, not least around what is “outside” of party-state structures, and
what is “the state.” This takes us into the realm of what we actually think
politics is, or questions of ontology. Is politics essentially a debate about who
the drivers of change (or upholders of continuity) are? Or is it something
else? Having established this, it is then fairly straightforward to explore what
different Vietnam scholars have said in relation to these two questions over
the years and how they differ, which we will do with reference to Fforde and
Malesky.
However, to pose the question of how best to analyze Vietnamese politics
also takes us in another direction, namely that of epistemology (i.e., on what
grounds we might judge whether any given approach to analyzing politics is
superior or inferior, convincing or unconvincing). Fforde’s position seems to
imply that we can—and indeed should—make such a judgement. But on
what grounds might we do this? We will return to this later.
To sum up the preceding discussion, we can perhaps begin to see that to
ask the seemingly innocuous question of how best to analyze Vietnamese
politics (or politics anywhere) takes us into challenging terrain. However,
once we become alert to the underlying questions of ontology and episte-
mology, we realize scholars of Vietnam politics hold profoundly different
assumptions.
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We are interested in Fforde’s and Malesky’s fundamental assumptions
about what politics is, leading us, in turn, to the question of how we might
decide between their distinctive approaches. In order to answer the question
of how we might decide between their particular approaches, we need to
come to a view as to what we think politics actually is (i.e., ontology forms
the basis on which we can answer questions about epistemology). This is
very different from more positivist approaches to political analysis, which
argue that deciding between competing arguments is simply about seeing
what argument is supported by what data. We are arguing, by contrast, that
adjudicating between different positions has less to do with “weighing the
data” and more to do with a series of a priori positions or beliefs (ontology)
that influences what we see or what we consider “reliable” data in the first
place. Moreover, these a priori positions are influenced by the relationship of
particular branches of political science to dominant power structures: the
closer a particular branch of political analysis is to dominant power struc-
tures, the less willing its proponents are to question the stability of key
concepts. This, we argue, applies to Malesky though not to Fforde. Finally,
it is worth noting that the kind of issues we are raising are not unique to
Vietnam studies. Rather, they rear their head in political science more gen-
erally but—as with Vietnam studies—different parts of the discipline tend to
operate in silos and hence we rarely confront difference.
With our analytical framework in place, let us now turn our attention to
Malesky’s writings on Vietnam.
Vietnam Politics According to Malesky
Edmund Malesky is Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke Uni-
versity in Durham, North Carolina. Prior to this, he was at the University of
California, San Diego. Malesky cut his teeth as a Vietnam specialist doing
doctoral work in the late s and early s by looking at the impact of
foreign direct investment on “provincial autonomy” and “reform.” More
recently, his work has focused on Vietnam’s National Assembly or parlia-
ment. Malesky’s work is often co-authored, most frequently with Paul Schu-
ler but with other scholars as well. Rather unusually for a Vietnam
specialist, Malesky is more likely to be published in political science journals
than he is in area study journals, and he sometimes writes on wider debates
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within political science without reference to Vietnam at all. Apart from
writing on the National Assembly, Malesky has done comparative work on
China and Vietnam. One other distinctive feature of Malesky’s writing is
his research methods, specifically a preference for empirical testing using
quantitative statistical analysis. His research design is often highly innova-
tive. One of his articles, for instance, utilized a randomized experiment to
test the effects of transparency on the behavior of National Assembly dele-
gates along with their chances for re-election.
Earlier, we explained our interest in understanding Malesky’s and Fforde’s
fundamental assumptions about politics before considering how we might
choose between their accounts. One way to get at a person’s fundamental
assumptions about politics is simply to look at what they argue—not as
something divorced from their fundamental assumptions but as a clue to
them. With this in mind, we now look at the kind of things Malesky says
in his writing on the National Assembly. After this, we will examine one of his
articles in more detail to flesh out his position more clearly.
Part of what Malesky does in his writing on the National Assembly is to
shed light on the kind of institution he thinks it is. A recurring theme in his
work is that the National Assembly is to be analyzed as an institution in an
“authoritarian” system as distinct from a “democratic” system. Malesky
occasionally highlights points of overlap between democratic and authori-
tarian politics. However, this is only done in passing and never pursued, and
he often warns of the dangers of viewing authoritarian and democratic
systems as equivalent.
Beyond this, Malesky’s research on the National Assembly revolves
around three key areas: firstly, the process by which members of parliament,
or delegates, are elected, and what the regime seeks to achieve through
elections; secondly, whether the National Assembly is representative of vo-
ters; and thirdly, whether the National Assembly’s influence in politics is
growing. The latter is explored with reference to the impact the National
Assembly is able to have on legislative policy and, more generally, whether it
is able to call the government to account.
On the question of how the electoral process works, Malesky notes that
while voters directly elect candidates, the central party-state is more or less
able to achieve the election outcome it wants. This is what he means by his
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“paint by numbers” approach in which the authorities pre-plan the kind of
National Assembly they want ahead of the election. They are able to
achieve the outcomes they desire partly through the vetting of candidates
but also through a mixture of altering the candidate-to-seat ratio to ensure
that favored candidates face an easier contest, and placing preferred candi-
dates alongside weaker ones. Consequently, Malesky argues that while
there have been efforts to make the process “appear more democratic,” this
should be taken with a pinch of salt.
On the question of whether the National Assembly represents voters,
Malesky’s answer flows fairly logically from his previous one. Delegates
generally do not “reflect the will of the voters,” he writes, adding that dele-
gates who are dependent on the central party and state for nomination to the
National Assembly (and future promotion in the party-state) tend not to be
critical of the government.He notes that some other groups, such as locally
nominated delegates, tend to be more critical as evidenced by the speeches
they give and the questions they ask.
On the question of the National Assembly’s influence in politics, Malesky
argues that while the National Assembly has grown stronger in recent years,
there are limitations to this. For instance, following revisions to the consti-
tution in , laws are now subject to greater scrutiny in the National
Assembly than they were before. Delegates, on the whole, are asking tougher
questions of the government than they used to, and the Assembly can no
longer be guaranteed to wave through nominees to cabinet positions. On
the other hand, while National Assembly delegates can introduce comments
or a petition about legislation, they cannot introduce legislation directly;
only high-ranking government officials can do this. Moreover, Malesky
argues that delegates are always at an information disadvantage compared to
the government, and lack experience and capacity. There have been some
improvements on this front: delegates are better educated than they used to
be, and there are now more university professors, doctors, lawyers, and
private business people in the National Assembly than in the past.
While the preceding analysis offers some useful insights into Malesky’s
ideas, we need to go into a bit more detail to ensure a solid platform from
which to say something about his fundamental assumptions about politics.
To do this, we will look at one of his single-authored articles where he
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examines Vietnam’s escape from what he calls the “partial reform equilib-
rium” (PRE).
The notion of the PRE comes from scholar Joel Hellman, who argues
that “transition economies” pursuing economic reform run the risk of
reforms stalling as “winners” from initial reforms can use their “newfound
power to block further reform.” To escape the partial reform equilibrium,
Malesky writes, policymakers need to do two things: first to overcome
opposition from the “early winners” and second to unite “a disparate group
of potential beneficiaries from future reforms into an alternative coali-
tion.” Writing in , Malesky sees the PRE as perfectly describing the
situation in Vietnam:
Just as the logic of the PRE would predict, SOEs [state-owned enterprises]
used their newfound power to prevail in Hanoi . . . blocking any reform that
would hurt their dominant market position. . .Attempts by reform-minded
delegates [in the Central Committee] to push new reform policies forward
were met with consistent and widely publicized failure.
According to Malesky, this all changed after  as Vietnam overcame the
PRE and pursued a “rapid economic reform agenda.” This was achieved by
a conscious and determined strategy on the part of “reformers” in which
they “carefully divided provinces dominated by SOEs . . . to create pairs of
new provinces” where one was still dominated by the state sector and the
other was a “non-state” province. The non-state provinces “all stood to
benefit from reforms that undermined SOE power,”Malesky writes, arguing
that because non-state provinces were less dependent on SOE revenue, “they
were more willing to vote for progress on economic reforms.”
According to Malesky, the reformers, whom he identifies as people like
Võ Văn Kiệt, Phan Văn Khải, and Nguyễn Cơ Thạch, were seeking to
redraw provincial boundaries to achieve a particular end, namely to “em-
power . . . a specific type of reformist voter.” Indeed, Malesky is quite spe-
cific about what the then Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt was seeking to do,
saying “the Prime Minister was aware that he was carving lines around the
state sector and determining the province’s incentives by the structure of the
economy.” While the full details of Malesky’s hypothesis testing need not
concern us, he offers data showing how a redrawing of provincial boundaries
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in  did indeed create seven pairs of new provinces, one with a large SOE
sector and one without.
The question we are interested in is whether this is a plausible account or
not. So, with this in mind, and as a preliminary step, let us now take stock of
what we have learned in terms of Malesky’s approach to thinking about
politics. There are five points.
First, we can see that Malesky’s approach involves focusing on a key
national political institution, namely the National Assembly. There is noth-
ing wrong with doing this per se, but it almost certainly involves assump-
tions about what it is to study politics. Again, there may be nothing wrong
with these assumptions, but we want to be clear about what they are.
Second, Malesky thinks in terms of authoritarian and democratic sys-
tems. Based on his way of thinking, Vietnam is clearly in the former camp
and, for him, to refer to the country in this way is helpful. Malesky is also not
keen to pursue possible points of connection between so-called authoritarian
and democratic systems because in his view they are fundamentally
different.
Third, there is a big emphasis in Malesky’s work on politics as being
about policy. He is not blind to ideas of patronage, but an emphasis on
politics as being about policy is a recurring theme. We see this in his writing
on the National Assembly, where a constant refrain is the extent to which the
institution is able to affect the legislative or policymaking process. However,
that politics is about policy comes up in other contexts as well (e.g. provin-
cial boundaries were redrawn in  to enable reformers to pursue “radical
policies”).
Fourth, there is a strong presumption in Malesky’s writing regarding
intentionality on the part of elites. That is, he has no hesitation in saying
that we know that reformers were redrawing provincial boundaries to enable
them to pursue reforms. That this is what is happening is clear to him and it
is something we can know.
Lastly, much of Malesky’s analysis of Vietnamese politics is conducted
with a presumption that liberal politics is the yardstick against which Viet-
nam should be measured. Thus, with reference to the National Assembly,
key issues are whether it is representative of voters and whether it is able to
hold government to account. These are attributes one would instinctively
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refer to with reference to parliaments in liberal political settings. Clearly,
Malesky thinks Vietnam falls short with respect to liberal politics, but his
discussion is always presented with an eye to whether Vietnam is moving in
a liberal direction. What we never get fromMalesky is an exploration of how
the National Assembly may be better understood with reference to a different
set of, say, non-liberal norms. Indeed, there are times when Malesky appears
to interpret statements by Vietnamese officials through a liberal lens, state-
ments that could quite easily be understood with reference to non-liberal
norms.
We will come back to these points later after considering Fforde’s
approach to thinking about Vietnamese politics in the following section.
We will pursue the same approach as we did with Malesky, namely first
identifying some key themes before looking at some of his articles in more
detail.
Vietnam Politics According to Fforde
Adam Fforde is an economist and economic historian who writes a lot about
politics. He is professorial fellow at the Victoria Institute of Strategic Eco-
nomic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne. Previously, he has held posts
at the Australia National University and at the National University of Sin-
gapore. His engagement with Vietnam goes back to the late s. Fforde
completed a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Cambridge in  on
agricultural development in North Vietnam. His first book, co-authored
with Suzanne Paine, was published in  and he has written widely on
the political economy of reform, state industry, development, and pol-
itics. His articles have tended to be published in area studies, Communist
transition, and economics journals, although he occasionally publishes in
political science journals as well. Fforde commonly draws comparisons
with the former Soviet Union and China in his work, and he has done
comparative work on Vietnam and Cambodia. His research methodology
is qualitative and he pays quite a bit of attention to discourse, including
investigating the precise meaning of Vietnamese political language. His
Vietnamese language skills are known to be excellent.
Fforde is best known for his work on the transition from the planned to
the market economy. In particular, he popularized the Vietnamese term
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translated as “fence-breaking” [phá rào] to capture the way in which the
emergence of the market economy was primarily driven by spontaneous
marketization or “bottom-up” processes whereby farmers or state enter-
prises took it upon themselves to operate outside of the planned economy.
Fforde dates this back to North Vietnam in the s (i.e., well before so-
called “reforms” or Đổi Mới in ). This leads Fforde to emphasize what
he calls “endogenous” drivers of change as distinct from “policy,” the impor-
tance of which he downplays. Policy is not unimportant for Fforde, but he
argues that it is frequently reactive to events rather than determinative of
them. Summing up his position, he says that his account seeks to break free
from one that privileges the Vietnamese Communist Party as the author of
change in favor of a “wide range of diverse independent actors.” Thus, he
rather nicely says that Vietnam’s economy was in effect “auto-reformed.”
While there is clearly an interweaving of economics and politics, it is
Fforde’s ideas about politics that we are particularly interested in. In 
and , Fforde published two articles on Vietnam whose titles contain the
phrases “the road to ungovernability” and “popular authority seeking
power.” Both titles offer important clues to his thinking about politics.
They also point to a position he has held consistently ever since, often
against the prevailing wisdom, which has tended to emphasize Vietnam’s
stability and success.
For Fforde, the party-state in Vietnam is very weak. While he would
argue that this has always been the case, he believes the problems worsened
during the mid-s and s. More than this, Fforde argues that since
the emergence of the market economy, there has been very little rethinking
of formal politics, despite the fact that circumstances are now radically
changed. Instead, old Leninist or neo-Soviet institutions—and associated
thinking—persist, but they are increasingly ill-equipped to address the chal-
lenges the country faces. These challenges include the economy’s far greater
complexity now that the country has reached middle-income status—
including the greater complexity of what is required if prosperity is to be
maintained—as well as challenges posed by the emergence of new social
classes as the country has developed.
Up until around , there was still enough “residual authority” in the
system, Fforde argues, for the party-state to be able to exercise power in the
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event of a crisis. However, ten years later even this could not be guaranteed.
Moreover, by the mid-s, the party-state was “far from the people” and
highly corrupt. Indeed, echoing Martin Gainsborough, he argues that the
party-state was increasingly just a vehicle for powerful people to pursue
their interests, adding that it exhibits no clear developmental rationale for
its activities, much less follow-through. As Fforde says, “the higher levels
instruct, the lower levels don’t listen” [trên bảo dưới không nghe].
Assuming his analysis is correct, this is by no measure a healthy state of
affairs.
In terms of how we should understand this politically, Fforde’s analysis is
particularly insightful. Drawing on work by F.J. Hinsley on sovereignty,
Fforde characterizes the problem as a crisis of the “meaning of political
authority” (italics added). That is, on what grounds does the party-state
rule and to what ends, he asks? He argues that if anyone was to ask how to
understand the “very nature of the state [in Vietnam]—its ontology,” they
would not “receive a satisfactory answer.” To reiterate, as Fforde says—
again drawing on Gainsborough—that it is all about “spoils” (i.e., elites
feathering their nests) and this is no basis on which to rule. Strikingly, it
is not just Fforde who is making these points. Rather, very senior Vietnam-
ese (e.g. academics in government research institutes) are too. He quotes
a comment heard at a workshop held in  to discuss Party Congress
documents: “We say that the Party holds power—but how does it do this?
Whose power does it hold? And who gives that power to the Party?” To
hear these questions being asked at senior levels is startling and highly
significant.
Against this backdrop of “conservative formal politics,” Fforde notes how
events on the ground, not surprisingly, have a momentum of their own. He
illustrates this in a whole series of ways, but one way he does so is with
reference to village politics. Here, he shows the party-state is neither in
control nor has it managed to adapt its thinking to the new situation. He
illustrates his argument through a linguistic analysis of the Vietnamese term
cơ sở (usually translated as “grassroots,” as in grassroots democracy, where
many have suggested Vietnam is experimenting with “more democracy” at
the grassroots). Fforde finds that cơ sở is better understood as referring to the
base of the apparat (i.e., of the party-state). That is, in contrast to the way in
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which it is commonly understood by Western analysts, there is no sense in
which the base of the apparat is meant to be controlled by the local popula-
tion (as in popular political control). However, while this is the formal
understanding, what Fforde notes is that actual practice in the countryside
has moved on with the rise of informal farmers’ groups. Such groups are
increasingly asserting that “their man,” not the party-state’s man, gets to lead
the village, and, according to Fforde, they are winning the day.
To recap, Fforde’s argument is that over the last thirty years, there has
been no rethinking of political ideas that could explain how and why the
party-state should govern in the entirely changed conditions that now pre-
vail. Old political institutions continue to exist, but there is no clarity as to
how they should relate to new groups (e.g. informal farmers’ groups, free
trade unions, NGOs). Meanwhile, in practice, what we see, and have seen for
many years, is a series of tactical retreats by the party-state as it concedes to
the new reality. Fforde is not entirely pessimistic about the implications of
this situation for the future, but he argues that the gulf between the formal
position and how things actually are will, at some stage, have to be resolved,
and resolved conclusively.
While we have highlighted clear continuity between Fforde’s views on
politics first expressed in – and some of his most recent writing
(e.g. around –), it is worth checking the extent to which Fforde’s
ideas have evolved (or not evolved) since his early publications in the s.
For instance, did Fforde always see things the way he does now, or could we
argue that his earlier work brings him closer to Malesky’s approach? The
simple answer is no. What is striking in reviewing Fforde’s early work is the
relative consistency of his approach over the years. Of course, there is some
refinement of his analysis over the years as one would expect, but one can
detect a distinctive Ffordian character even in his earliest work. As early as
, Fforde can be seen to be adopting a critical approach to the notion of
“policy.” Moreover, his ideas about fence-breaking, which clearly go back
to his doctoral research, is evident in his work in the early s. Thus, the
notion that Fforde ever wrote uncritically about “policy” and hence was
formerly closer to Malesky would be a major misreading.
We are now in a position to take stock of Fforde’s arguments, particularly
to try and tease out what they tell us about his fundamental understanding of
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politics. We will then compare his ideas with Malesky’s. Both issues are
considered in the next section.
Malesky vs. Fforde: Similarities and Differences?
Beyond the specifics of his analysis, Fforde’s thinking about politics can be
synthesized with reference to three key points.
First, his is an account that downplays the privileging of policy in under-
standing change. Moreover, with this comes the idea that the party-state,
and those who inhabit it, lack intentionality. That is, it is not easy to identify
a coherent, developmental rationale, in terms of state action (i.e., the state
acting in specific ways with a view to achieve specific ends, where such
things are considered and weighed carefully). To drive home this point,
it is worth noting that Fforde believes Vietnam has been lucky in achieving
what it has (he attributes this to circumstances coming together in favorable
ways). As he says, the economy “auto-reformed.” However, the favorable
conditions evident in the late s and first half of the s have now
dissipated.
Second, Fforde sees the party-state as weak and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, lacking in a rationale for rule. He is fond of quoting John Dunn’s
distinction between the state as “sociological fact” and the state as “norma-
tive political proposal.” While the architecture of the state clearly exists
(i.e., the state as “sociological fact”), for Fforde the state is looking increas-
ingly threadbare as a “normative political proposal.” The questions raised
about political power by participants at the workshop held to discuss draft
Congress documents in , and cited above, are instructive.
Third, while Fforde sees formal politics as suffering from a lack of serious
rethinking about how the state might govern, he is clear that the reality on
the ground is moving on. This manifests in multiple ways, from powerful
business interests “doing their own thing” to the State Bank being unable to
impose macroeconomic discipline. However, one of the things he notes,
going back to his  article, is “popular authority seeking power.” Fforde
documents this in respect to informal farmers’ groups but it is evident in
urban life too.
Let us now compare Fforde with Malesky. Given the analysis so far, we
can now see how very different these two authors are both in their approach
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to studying politics and their ideas. Malesky places a big emphasis on politics
being about policy. Fforde does not. Malesky places a big emphasis on elite
intentionality. Fforde does not.
Malesky writes at length about the National Assembly, a formal organ of
the party-state. He debates whether it has become stronger as an actor within
the Vietnamese political process (e.g. “more teeth” when it comes to amend-
ing legislation). Fforde, meanwhile, talks about the profound incoherence of
the party-state. For Fforde, the emperor has no clothes. It is no longer able to
govern, and people are increasingly at a loss to know what the party-state
exists for. Moreover, while Malesky is considering whether the National
Assembly has become a more effective law-making body, Fforde talks about
situations where “laws passed by the National Assembly” are “profoundly
incoherent.” He cites research he conducted on the  Law on Cadres and
Public Servants [Luật Cán bộ và Công chức], where he found “no clear
understanding at the city level of what these terms usually referred to.” As
Fforde says, “the law was empty of meaning.” Such differences between
Fforde and Malesky are significant, and it is hard to know how they can both
be right.
Furthermore, while Malesky’s analysis tends to be conducted with a lib-
eral presumption about politics, Fforde is at pains to emphasize the way in
which, contrary to much Western thinking, there are no such presumptions
in formal political thinking (e.g. the lowest level of the party-state is not
supposed to be subject to popular political control). To push the point
further, from a Ffordian perspective, one might ask why would one scruti-
nize the workings of the National Assembly. If one wants to understand
Vietnamese politics, one needs to look elsewhere and conduct the analysis in
a different way.
Lastly, while Malesky operates fairly easily with concepts such as
“reform,” “policy,” “the economy,” and “the state,” Fforde is constantly
raising questions about them. These terms are not self-evident or stable for
Fforde, going right back to his earliest research. For Malesky, they appear
to be.
We began this article by taking up Fforde’s call for a “very noisy argu-
ment” about how best to analyze Vietnamese politics. We have now laid
Fforde alongside Malesky with some quite startling results: as we have seen,
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the differences between them are profound. The question we now come to is
on what basis we might choose between these rival accounts and also how we
might explain their differences.
How Best to Analyze Vietnamese Politics? Adjudicating
between Rival Accounts
Malesky is at his most convincing when he tells us how the central party-
state achieves the outcome it wants in National Assembly elections. He also
insightfully shows how greater exposure to transparency in Vietnam tends
not to have the effect on Vietnamese officials that conventional thinking
would expect it to—so much for the pursuit of transparency initiatives by the
international aid community. However, Malesky is much less convincing in
terms of his broader understanding of the nature of politics. Here, we need
Fforde with his emphasis on state weakness and the absence of new thinking
by the party-state in terms of how to govern. Indeed, one might say that
debates about whether the National Assembly is growing stronger is a dis-
traction from political realities—a bit like how a focus on sparring between
Republicans and Democrats in the United States might be viewed as a dis-
traction from how elite power actually works.
There is no silver bullet for knowing who is right and who is wrong when
one gets into questions of epistemology. However, considering issues of
ontology is crucial. Fforde’s probing of the fundamental nature of politics,
his ideas about the roots of political power, and his more nuanced approach
to causality, point to issues we need to be taking more seriously in Vietnam-
ese political analysis. There is also something about what one can know and
what one cannot: Fforde is more circumspect than Malesky here and is more
convincing for it. To give an example, Malesky argues that Võ Văn Kiệt
sought to outmaneuver his opponents in order to pursue particular kinds of
economic policies by redrawing provincial boundaries in a particular way.
However, it is far from clear either that this is what happened, or that we can
know this with any reliability, or that Malesky’s methodological approach
helps us know this with any greater certainty.
The next question is how one might explain the differences between
Malesky and Fforde—both highly intelligent scholars with impressive cre-
dentials. How can they see things so differently?
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There may be much that is imponderable here. However, the answer
almost certainly lies with the circles they move in. If one is in United States
(or the United Kingdom) political science—which is the context in which
Malesky publishes his work—certain kinds of conceptual tools and meth-
odologies are expected of you. Moreover, some things cannot be said, and,
conversely, certain things “make sense” in that environment but make less
sense in a different environment. Fforde moves in different circles than
Malesky—again note where Fforde publishes his work.
However, there is a deeper question of why one particular branch of
political science does not like to ask the kind of questions that Fforde is
fond of. Slavoj Žižek draws on the idea of “the real” (i.e., how things truly
are) in invoking the notion of a “traumatic real kernel” that we spend a lot of
time trying to avoid because it is too unsettling. We can apply this to our
analysis of politics and the political science community in which Malesky
sits. To raise fundamental questions about things we usually take for granted
—such as “policy,” “the economy,” and “the state”—and to find that things
we think are secure are not so secure but rather are simply ideas (“normative
political proposals”) is not an avenue everyone wants to go down.
However, there is a wider political point at stake here; it is not just
a matter of personal preference. Malesky’s analysis of Vietnam as an
“authoritarian regime” that cannot be compared with a “democratic” one
is not simply an analytical distinction within comparative politics. Rather, it
is a political discourse that upholds a form of global rule, which puts some
countries at the top and some at the bottom. Mainstream political science,
of which Malesky is a part, is complicit in this form of rule. The irony is that
one catches glimpses in Malesky’s account of an awareness that so-called
“authoritarian” and “democratic” states can in fact be usefully compared, but
the rules of the game according to which he is operating, mean that he does
not pursue this. Fforde’s branch of politics is not so constrained. Indeed, he
relishes destabilizing these established norms, much to the annoyance of
those outside his camp.
Conclusion
We began this article by taking up Fforde’s challenge for a “decent and likely
very noisy argument about how best to analyze Vietnamese politics.”Having
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conducted this piece of research, we are clear that there is room for the ideas
of both scholars in the field of Vietnam politics. Indeed, it would be pro-
foundly short-sighted and illiberal if we were to try and sideline or dismiss
any perspective. However, this is not to say we think that all perspectives are
of equal merit. Comparing Fforde with Malesky, we have highlighted some
profound differences between their respective approaches, which take us to
the heart of what we think politics actually is (i.e., ontology). Being clearer
about this is crucial if we are to ever to come to sound judgements about
epistemology (i.e., adjudicate between rival accounts).
One way to articulate this is to ask ourselves whether it is meaningful
and/or helpful to debate whether Vietnam’s National Assembly is becoming
a more effective law-making body or whether we think this is a distraction
from politics as it really is. It is not that there is no debate to be had about the
changing position of the National Assembly (or any other Leninist institu-
tion) in Vietnamese political life. However, it does not go to the heart of the
matter, which has more to do with there being a crisis in the meaning of
political authority in Vietnam, an absence in new thinking and practice
about how to rule in changed circumstances, and an inability to answer
fundamental questions about what the party-state is there to do and where
its authority comes from. Meanwhile, against this backdrop, practice (i.e.,
“what actually happens”) is running away with itself, and, ultimately, this is
not sustainable. These are the areas on which future research should focus. It
does not matter particularly where scholars look to do their research (“inside”
the party-state, “outside” of it)—all areas are potentially fruitful—but scholars
need to focus on these issues if we are to get at the cutting edge of where
Vietnamese politics is at today.
Lastly, there is a need for greater honesty regarding the fact that there are
profoundly different approaches to analyzing Vietnampolitics operating in the
field. Scholarship is not served by us operating in silos or simply ignoring our
differences.Weneed to discuss our differences, and that includes scholars of the
calibre ofMalesky and Fforde. Let us be clear about the underlying assumptions
we are working with. Let us be willing to defend our particular approaches, but
let us also be open to refining them in light of debate, working across the usual
divides to produce cutting-edge research. Getting this right is not simply of
academic interest—it concerns the future of ninety-five million people.
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A B S T R A C T
The article explores different ways of thinking about Vietnamese politics
through an examination of the writing of Adam Fforde and Edmund
Malesky. It argues that in order to adjudicate between different approaches to
analysing Vietnamese politics, we need to come to a view about what we think
politics actually is (i.e., ontology forms the basis on which we can answer
questions about epistemology). This is very different from more positivist
approaches to political analysis which argue that deciding between competing
arguments is about weighing the data. I argue, by contrast, that adjudicating
between rival positions has more to do with a series of a priori positions or
beliefs that influence what we consider reliable data in the first place.
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